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CHURNING IN SECURITIES: FULL
COMPENSATION FOR THE INVESTOR
Warren H. Hyman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the context of securities accounts, the relationship of broker and
customer is generally one of trust.1 The customer assumes that his or
her portfolio will be managed to its best advantage and that the stocks
comprising it will be retained or traded in a fiscally rational manner.
However, the broker's dual roles as adviser with a fiduciary interest in
the customer and salesman with a sometimes scheming interest in commissions suggest the potential for conflict. Brokers may be tempted to
"churn up" accounts for the sole purpose of generating commissions.'
Poetically labeled "churning," this offense consists in the broker's inducing of transactions in an account, excessive in size and frequency in
light of the character of the customer's account. 8
As recently as the 1960's, few customers brought civil actions
against brokers for churning. 4 In prior years, the problem was addressed almost exclusively by the Securities and Exchange Commission
in actions brought under the. antifraud provisions of the federal securities acts.' In the last decade, however, an ever-increasing number of
* Assistant Professor of Law, Baruch College, The City University of New York. B.A., Long
Island University (1952); J.D., Brooklyn Law School (1953).
1. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 1981); Mihara v. Dean
Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821-22 (9th Cir. 1980); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570
F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430
F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1970); Note, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 HARV. L. REV. 869,
870 (1967). But see infra note 47.
2. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 326; Note, supra note 1, at 870.
3. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 324; Mihara,619 F.2d at 820-21; Rolf, 570 F.2d at 44-45; Juster
v. Rothschild, Unterberg & Towbin, 554 F. Supp. 331, 332-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
4. See Note, supra note 1, at 869.
5. See id. The SEC was a creation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Ch. 404, § 4, 48
Stat. 881, 885 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (1976)). Two years later, the SEC was
vested by statute with enforcement mechanisms specifically designed to aid it in the oversight of
brokers and dealers. Act of May 27, 1936, Pub. L. No. 621, § 3, 49 Stat. 1375, 1378 (1936)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 780(b) (1976)). In 1937, rules were enacted under which the
first SEC actions against churners would be brought. 2 Fed. Reg. 1389 (1937) (codified as
amended at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c1-1 to .15c-8 (1983)). These rules gave meaning to the federal
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civil actions have been brought against brokers alleging churning.6 The
suits, usually brought in the federal courts,7 have been waged under a
variety of new theories of recovery.' This article will outline the causes
of action that have been relied upon by customers, after a brief description of the elements of proof necessary in such a case. The damages
allowed by the courts and possible defense tactics will be considered
later. The article will conclude with some reasons for concern with the
courts' current capacity to offer redress for the problem.

II. THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
A.

The Offense

A broker's excessive trading of an account to generate commissions is an offense against both federal securities law and state common
securities acts' prohibition of the use of "any manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device
or contrivance" in securities transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1976). The rules most pertinent
to the offense of churning specifically define "device or contrivance" to include (1) "any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person," 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2(a) (1983), and (2) "any transactions or purchase or sale which
are excessive in size or frequency in view of the financial resources and character of such account," 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7(a) (1983). For a discussion of these rules, see L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 803-05

(1983).

. A number of years after their adoption, this arsenal of rules began to be used by the SEC in
actions against brokers and dealers charged with churning. However, the procedures and sanctions
of an SEC administrative adjudication differ markedly from those of the typical private suit for
churning. S. JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS § 7.08 (1977); N. WOLFSON, R.
PHILLIPS & T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 2.01, at
2-5 to 2-9 (1977). Moreover, the statutory foundation of the typical SEC action is often of limited
applicability to the private right of action for churning See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
This article will address only the private right of action for churning. For a sampling of the
occasions when the SEC has addressed churning and the closely related doctrine of unsuitability,
see In re Cipar, Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 19,633 (Mar. 28, 1983); In re Tennenbaum, Sec.
Exch. Act Release No. 18,429 (Jan. 19, 1982); In re Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp.,
Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 17,416 (Jan. 6, 1981); In re Bear, Stearns & Co., Sec. Exch. Act
Release No. 16,023 (July 16, 1979); In re Kinderdick, Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 12,818 (Sept.
21, 1976); In re Batterman, 46 S.E.C. 304 (1976); In re Fenocchio, Sec. Exch. Act Release No.
12,194 (Mar. 11, 1976); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 11,515 (July 2, 1975); In re Mississippi Valley Inv. Co., Sec. Exch. Act Release No.
12,683 (Aug. 2, 1972); In re Shearson, Hammill &,Co., 42 S.E.C. 811 (1965); In re R.H. Johnson. & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467 (1955), afd, 231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844
(1956); In re Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865 (1946), affd, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir.
1949); In re E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347 (1945).
6. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 323.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 326 (churning creates a private right of action under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and common-law breach of fiduciary duty); Rolf, 570 F.2d at 43-44
(churning creates an action for aiding and abetting and may create vicarious liability under the
controlling persons doctrine of § 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and/or the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior); Brodsky, Measuring Damages in Churning and Suitability Cases, 6 SEc. REG. L.J. 157, 158-59 (1978) (variety of measures of damages).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/2
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law.' From this offense the broker's customer suffers two distinct
harms. 10 First, the customer is charged excessive commissions irrespective of any increase or decrease in the value of the customer's portfolio." Second, the customer's portfolio may suffer in value under a del-

uge of unsuitable transactions entered merely to generate fees for the
broker. 1 Whether the transactions are unsuitable as well as excessive
is determined by examining the customer's objectives and the market
conditions at the time of the alleged offense.18
Churning has been characterized as a "unified offense": an offense
not limited to any specific transaction or transactions. 4 Rather, the
essence of churning is an aggregation of transactions. 5 That is, a broker's handling of an account is viewed in hindsight and compared to
the customer's actual needs and wishes. 6 Because there are numerous
legitimate ways for a broker to handle an account-and because even
the best of faith by a broker can result in trading losses-we shall see7
that proof of damages in a churning cause of action is difficult indeed.1
B. Elements of the Case
Three elements are essential to establish churning: 1) excessive
trading in light of the customer's investment objectives, 2) the broker's
exercise of control over trading in the account, and 3) an intent to defraud by the broker or willful and reckless disregard for the customer's

9. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1981); Mihara v. Dean
Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1980); Comment, Private Actions for the Broker's
Churning of a Securities Account, 40 Mo. L. REV. 281, 292-95 (1975).
10. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 326; Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 48-49
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Brodsky, supra note 8, at 159-61.
11. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 326; Rolf, 570 F.2d at 48, 50; Mauriber v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,444, at 96,529 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1983);
Brodsky, supra note 8, at 159.
12. See S. JAFF, supra note 5, at 307 ("high trading activity is also high risk activity and,
with the possible exception of trading by a highly skilled professional, unprofitable"). See also
Miley, 637 F.2d at 326; Nichols, The Broker's Duty to His Customer Under Evolving Federal
Fiduciaryand Suitability Standards, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 435, 445 (1977); Brodsky, supra note
8, at 159.
13. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 327; Mihara, 619 F.2d at 820-21; Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d
251, 258 (4th Cir. 1975); Brodsky, supra note 8, at 158; Comment, supra note 9, at 281-82.
14. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 327.
15. See id.; Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Mauriber,
[Current) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,444, at 96,529; Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288
F. Supp. 836, 846-47 (E.D. Va. 1968).
16. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 327; Mihara, 619 F.2d at 821; Mauriber, [Current] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 99,444, at 96,529; Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 846; Brodsky, supra note 8, at 15859; Comment, supra note 9, at 284.
17. See, e.g., Miley, 637 F.2d at 327; Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 849-50. See also notes 135text.
accompanying
38 andby
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interests. 1 8 Proof of these elements has been held to permit recovery
under the federal securities laws' section 10(b)" and rule lOb-5. 20
Moreover, these same elements may at times be sufficient to prove pendent state claims such as common-law fraud2 1 and breach of the broker's fiduciary duty to his or her customer.2
1. Excessive Trading
Issues of proof of excessive trading center on whether the size and
frequency of the transactions engaged in by the broker were excessive
in regard to the needs and objectives of the customer and the type of
account involved.23 Since churning is considered a unified offense, a review of the whole series of transactions entered by the broker for the
customer is necessary to determine if the transactions were "excessive."
Courts utilize a number of factors and techniques to analyze the issue
of excessive trading.
The investment objectives of the customer are a primary factor.2 4
If the customer is interested in short-term, speculative profits, more activity than average should be expected.2 5 However, if the customer
18. See Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 709 F.2d 1413, 1416-17 (llth
Cir. 1983); Miley, 637 F.2d at 324; Mihara, 619 F.2d at 821; Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon &
Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1039-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff/d in part and rev'd in part, 570 F.2d 38
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
Compare the elements of the offense as set out in the proposed Federal Securities Code:
It is unlawful for a broker, dealer, municipal broker, or municipal dealer to effect with or
for a customer with respect to whose account he or his agent exercises investment discretion, or is in a position to determine the volume and frequency of transactions by reason of
the customer's willingness to follow his or his agent's suggestions, transactions that are
excessive in volume or frequency on consideration, of the amount of profits or commissions
of the broker, dealer, municipal broker, municipal dealer, or his agent in relation to the size
of the account and such other factors as the size and character of the account, the needs
and objectives of the customer as ascertained on reasonable inquiry, and the pattern of
trading in the account.
FEDERAL SEC. CODE § 1606 (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). See Miley, 637 F.2d at 324; Mihara, 619 F.2d at 820;
McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888, 890 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979); Hecht,
430 F.2d at 1206-07; Carras, 516 F.2d at 281.
21. Cf. Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024 (6th Cir. 1979) (claim
for relief under § 10(b) and rule lob-5 essentially counterpart to common-law fraud). But see
Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 847-48.
22. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 324-25.
23. See Thompson, 709 F.2d at 1416-17; Miley, 637 F.2d at 324-25; Mihara, 619 F.2d at
820-21; Carras, 516 F.2d at 258; Hecht, 430 F.2d at 1206-07; Mauriber, [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 99,444, at 96,529; Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 845-47; Comment, supra note 9, at
284-86.
24. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 333-34; Mihara,619 F.2d at 820-21; Hecht, 430 F.2d at 120607; Mauriber, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,444, at 96,529; Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at
845-47; Comment, supra note 9, at 284-85.
25. See Thompson, 709 F.2d at 1417 (no churning found when investor desired to "play the
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desires conservative investments to generate profits from dividends and
2
long-term growth, less than average activity should occur. Problems

arise when the customer's investment policies are unclear or have internal inconsistencies. 27 The broker, because of his experience and knowl-

edge, has the duty to clarify the customer's objectives and to explain
the inconsistencies." Fulfilling this duty will not only allow the broker
to meet his or her contractual obligations to the customer, but will also
protect the broker from later, unjustified claims that the customer's
objectives were compromised by excessive trading.

9

In establishing excessive trading, many courts also employ "turnover rate" calculations. Here, the total cost of purchases for the account during a given period of time is compared to the amount invested
at the beginning of the period.3 0 The turnover rate necessary to consti31
tute churning has varied, depending upon the facts of the case.
32
In-and-out trading is another example of excessive trading. This
pattern of trading occurs when all or part of a customer's portfolio is
sold with the proceeds immediately invested in other securities. These
3
new securities are then sold within a short period of time. A similar

market" and knew investments were inconsistent with a conservative strategy); Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 676-78 (9th Cir. 1982) (investor "was a trader looking for
quick, short-term gains, and taking short-term gains and losses requires frequent trading"; no
churning was established).
26. See Note, supra note 1, at 874-75; Miley, 637 F.2d at 325, 334 n.13.
27. See Note, supra note 1, at 874-75; Thompson, 709 F.2d at 1417; Miley, 637 F.2d at
325, 334 n.13.
28. See Note, supra note 1, at 875. See also infra notes 68-69 (the Know Your Customer
Rule of the NYSE and the Suitability Rule of the NASD).
29. See Note, supra note 1, at 875.
30. See Mihara, 619 F.2d at 819; Mauriber, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,444,
at 96,529; Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 842; Note, supra note 1,at 875.
31. See Mihara, 619 F.2d at 819 (average monthly turnover for a period of two years and
six months was 14 times and clearly supported a finding of excessive trading); Stevens, 288 F.
Supp. at 842 (an average of greater than two turnover rate per year was clearly evidence of
excessive trading); Hecht, 430 F.2d at 1210 (court affirmed that a turnover rate between 8.04 and
11.5 times during a six-year, ten-month period was evidence of churning).
"While there is no clear line of demarcation, courts and commentators have suggested that
an annual turnover rate of six reflects excessive trading." Mihara, 619 F.2d at 821 (citations
omitted). In Mauriber,the court stated that the failure of the plaintiff to calculate a turnover rate
was not fatal to the case; the turnover rate is not determinative of the plaintiff's case. Mauriber,
(Current] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 99,444, at 96,529.
32. See Mihara, 619 F.2d at 819; Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 842; Hecht v. Harris, Upham
& Co., 283 F..Supp. 417, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Comment, supra note 9, at 285; Note, supra note 1, at 876-77.
33. See Note, supra note 1, at 876-77. See also Mihara, 619 F.2d at 819 (during two-year,
six-month period, 81.6% of securities were held for 180 days or less); Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 840
(during five-year period, 85% of the securities were held less than six months, 70% were held 90
days or less, and 39% were held 30 days or less); Hecht, 283 F. Supp. at 436 (during six-year, tenmonth period, 45% of securities were held less than six months, 67% were held less than nine
less than a year).
82% were held
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abuse is reversal trading whereby particular securities are sold and
then repurchased within a short period of time. 4 In shuffling or crosstrading, a broker manipulates his or her customers' accounts so that
the customers effectively buy and sell only from one another.3a Proof
of any of these schemes is adduced through detailed listings of the
transactions made during the alleged churning period.a Justifying any
of these particular trading patterns will be very difficult for the
broker.3 7

Brokerage profits excessive in view of the size of the customer's
investment are another factor considered by the courts." These high
profits generally coincide with a high turnover rate. In many cases, the
fees generated from the churned customer's account represent a large
portion of that broker's entire income.3 '
2.

The Broker's Exercise of Control

Proof of exercise of control by the broker over the customer's account is determined by the facts and circumstances of each case."
Clearly, in a discretionary account arrangement, the broker has control." Likewise, a broker is "in control" when he or she influences the
customer to such an extent that the broker is, in effect, making the
decision to invest and the customer is relying upon his or her decisions. 4 The court will examine the sophistication and experience of the
customer with respect to securities transactions 43 and the amount of
In a typical churning situation, the turnover rate is high in the early stages, followed by
longer holding periods later on. Mihara, 619 F.2d at 819.
34. See. e.g., Comment, supra note 9, at 285.
35. See, e.g., Note, supra note 1, at 877.
36. See id. See also Mihara, 619 F.2d at 819; Hecht, 283 F. Supp. at 436.
37. See Note, supra note 1, at 877.
38. See id. at 877-78; Comment, supra note 9, at 286.
39. See Stevens, 288 F. Supp. 840 (fees earned from the plaintiff's account amounted to
over 40% of the broker's profits for two of the five years in question); Hecht, 283 F. Supp. at 436
(commissions generated from plaintiff's account amounted to 51% of total commissions earned by
broker for the period).
40. Note, supra note 1, at 871-74. See. e.g., Mihara, 619 F.2d at 821; Mauriber, [Current]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,444, at 96,526; Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 838, 840.
41. Note, supra note 1, at 871. In a discretionary account, the broker has the power to
exercise his or her own discretion in making securities transactions. Id. '
42. See Note, supra note 1, at 871-74. See, e.g., Mihara, 619 F.2d at 821 ("[t]he account
need not be a discretionary account whereby the broker executes each trade without the consent of
the client. As the Hecht case indicates, the requisite degree of control is met when the client
routinely follows the recommendations of the broker.").
43. See Note, supra note 1, at 872-74. See also Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 172 (10th Cir. 1974) ("the degree of sophistication of the investor is,
of course, important and it is a question of fact.... At bar, plaintiff arguably had no understanding of 'churning' or of its possible existence until after she had consulted an attorney."); Stevens,
288 F. Supp. at 838-40 (plaintiff described as a housewife with no business training, never em-
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reliance the customer places upon the broker's recommendations."
Such factors as the customer's general background and ability to
understand securities transactions as well as advice given by the broker
will all be considered.4 5 Dependence upon the broker is more likely in a
situation where the customer does not understand the securities market
or the advice of the broker."' Courts characterize this dependence as a
fiduciary relationship4 7 or one of trust and confidence, 48 requiring an
ployed for pay, and utterly naive and unsophisticated with reference to financial transactions).
44. See Note, supra note 1, at 872-74. See also Dzenits, 494 F.2d at 172 (whether there
was reliance by the plaintiff on the broker's statements and reassurances is a question of fact in a
churning case); Mauriber, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 99,444, at 96,526-27 (broker
secured control by pressuring plaintiff to sign documents giving discretionary powers to trade
plaintiff's account; broker continually assured plaintiff that her maneuvers were consistent with
plaintiff's investments objectives); Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 838-40 (plaintiff who funded her family's needs from the income from the investments turned over, in toto, the handling of her financial
affairs to the broker-defendant).
45. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 324-25; Mauriber, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,444 at 96,926-27; Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 838-40; Hecht, 283 F. Supp. at 434-35.
46. See Dzenits, 494 F.2d at 172. See also Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 838, 838-40 (plaintiff's
knowledge of the securities market was summarized by her answer that the difference between a
stock and a bond is that "stocks have names and bonds don't").
47. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 325; Mihara, 619 F.2d at 821-22. Such a characterization of the
broker as a fiduciary is not without difficulty when generally applied to the broker-dealer profession. The common law defined the fiduciary relation in terms of nice distinctions; such a relation
arose out of an "agent's" association with a "principal" whereby the agent would act on the
principal's "behalf and subject to his control." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1)
(1958) (emphasis added). Stockbrokers have therefore had occasion to proclaim themselves mere
principals in their dealings with customers. Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949). In a
principal to principal transaction conducted at arm's length and with the customer in control, no
fiduciary duty should attach:
Moreover, it seems often to be true, particularly in the case of the large stock and bond
dealing houses which frequently act for themselves as well as for others, that the principal
resorts to the so-called broker rather as one from whom stock, bonds and other similar
property can be obtained than as a mere agent, and under circumstances reasonably indicating that it is a matter of indifference to him whether he buys through his agency, so
long as the price contemplated is not exceeded. In such cases, it is difficult to see much
evidence of a fiduciary relationship.
2 F. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 2411, at 1976 (2d ed. 1914 & photo.
reprint 1979). See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 975 (1983);
W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 11 (1964).
This aside, the courts have not been hesitant to label a broker's duty to his or her customer a
"fiduciary" one. Several developments in the field of securities law have contributed to this nowexpansive accountability of the broker-dealer. First, the SEC has, from its earliest decisions, urged
that "[i]nherent in the relationship between a dealer and his customer is the vital representation
that the customer will be dealt with fairly, and in accordance with the standards of the profession." In re Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386, 388 (1939). See also In re William J. Stelmack Corp.,
11 S.E.C. 601, 621-22 (1942); In re Allender Co., 9 S.E.C. 1043, 1053-55 (1941); In re Hope, 7
S.E.C. 1082, 1083-84 (1940); In re Jansen and Co., 6 S.E.C. 391, 394 (1939). This line of administrative decisions gave rise to a 1943 circuit court decision which has come to dominate the field.
In affirming the SEC, the court in Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC held that a brokerage house, by
virtue of having held itself out as "competent" in investments, was thereby under a "duty" not to
overreach its customers-regardless of common-law agency principles. 139 F.2d 434, 436-37 (2d
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affirmative duty by the broker to recommend transactions to meet the
customer's needs and to object to those which do not."9 The problem
that occurs in churning is that the broker not only fails in this duty, but
also takes advantage of the customer's dependence and naivete.50
3. Broker's Intent to Defraud or Willful and Reckless Disregard for
the Customer's Interests.

Under the Supreme Court's holding in Ernst & Ernst v.

Hochfelder,5' scienter is now a requisite element to establish a violation
of federal securities rule 1Ob-5. 5a Since the majority of churning suits
allege a 1Ob-5 violation, the customer has almost universally been required to allege and prove scienter by the broker.5 A majority of recent federal court decisions hold that scienter may be established by
showing either the broker's intent to defraud or the broker's willful and
reckless disregard for the customer's interests." Recklessness has been
described as highly unreasonable conduct which is an extreme departure from the standard of ordinary care. 5
Proof of scienter tends to be conclusory. Churning, in itself, is considered a scheme or artifice to defraud within the meaning of rule 1Ob-

5.
5a Thus, once excessive trading and the broker's control are estab-

Cir. 1943). Better known as the "shingle theory," the reasoning of the court in Charles Hughes
remains potent precedent. Finally, the securities exchanges themselves have imposed duties upon
their broker-members in the form of "suitability rules" which demand of brokers standards of
commercial fair dealing beyond those required under the common law for arm's length transactions. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. See also L. Loss, supra, at 975.
It might now be said that "[t]he shingle and fiduciary theories have largely eliminated the
common-law distinction between a broker-dealer when acting as an agent, in the capacity of a
broker, and when acting as a principal, in the capacity of a dealer." N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS &
T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 2.03, at 2-15 (1977).
In the context of broker-dealer fraud, vestiges of agency doctrine linger, however. It is clear, for
instance, that a broker will be far less accountable "when his only relationship with the customer
is that of an order clerk." L. Loss, supra, at 976. It is in this gray area, with brokers that are
more than order clerks but less than managers of discretionary accounts, that debate is likely to
continue.
48. Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 846.
49. See id.; Note, supra note 1, at 871.
50. See, e.g., Mauriber, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,444, at 96,526-28; Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 838-40; Hecht, 283 F. Supp. at 434-35. See also Note, supra note 1,at 87374 (the broker may have greater fiduciary responsibilities in dealing with less educated, less experienced, unsophisticated investors).
51. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
52. Id. at 193. The Supreme Court left unanswered the question of whether recklessness
may satisfy the scienter requirement. Id. at 193-94 n.12.
53. Thompson, 709 F.2d at 1416-17; Miley, 637 F.2d at 324; Mihara, 619 F.2d at 821;
Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1023-24; Roll, 570 F.2d at 44-47; Carras, 516 F.2d at 256.
54. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 324; Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1023-24.
55. Rolf, 570 F.2d at 47.
56. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 324 n.4.
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lished, scienter would be assumed unless the broker could justify his or
57
her actions.
C.

Causes of Action

Churning is a recognized violation of the antifraud provisions of
the federal securities acts and has been held to give rise to a private
right of action under these acts.' 8 Customers have relied primarily
upon the broker's violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934" and Securities and Exchange Commission rule 1Ob-5.10
In basing their actions on these federal antifraud provisions, customers
are of course required to plead fraud with particularity in order to
avoid dismissal. 61
Several other provisions of the federal securities acts have been

57. See Rolf, 570 F.2d at 47.
58. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 324-25; Mahara, 619 F.2d at 820-21; Mansbach, 598 F.2d at
1023-25; Rolf, 570 F.2d at 44-48; Hecht, 430 F.2d at 1206-09; Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 845-47.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) provides:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
60. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983) provides:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
These two provisions, § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule lob-5, have a
broad application and a favorable statute of limitations. Because the Securities Act provides no
specified limitations period, the applicable state statute of limitations is used. See Stevens, 288 F.
Supp. at 844-45.
61. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) which provides "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally." See also Jenny v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,021, at
97,581 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1975).
The customer must plead specifically the use of an interstate commerce means or instrumentality and give the defendant fair notice of the asserted claims. See Burkhart v. Alson Realty
Trust, 363 F. Supp. 1286, 1289 (N.D. Il. 1973); Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210, 216 (D.
Colo. 1983).
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used as a basis by the customer for a private right of action."2 In particular, churning a customer's account is a violation of section 15(c)(1)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 193463 and Securities and Exchange
Commission rule 15cl-7." Rule 15cl-7 specifically prohibits excessive
trading. 6a However, section 15(c)(1) and rule 15c-7 are somewhat
limited in application."
The federal courts are divided 7 as to whether a private cause of
action may be maintained under the Know Your Customer Rule of the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 8 or the Suitability Rule of the

62. See Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 214 (in addition to other claims, plaintiff in a commodities
case was permitted to maintain a claim under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1976).
64. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7 (1983). See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 90-91 (2d
Cir. 1983); Zaretsky v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 509 F. Supp. 68, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Moscarelli v.
Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
65. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 15cl-7 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The term "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance," as used
in section 15(c) of the Act, is hereby defined to include any act of any broker, dealer or
municipal securities dealer designed to effect with or for any customer's account in respect
to which such broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer or his agent or employee is
vested with any discretionary power any transactions or purchase or sale which are excessive in size or frequency in view of the financial resources and character of such account.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7 (1983).
66. These provisions are limited in application to over-the-counter transactions. See Hecht,
283 F. Supp. at 431; Comment, supra note 9, at 288-90. Section 29(b) of the 1934 Act may apply
to § 15(c) actions and require that such actions be brought within one year after the sale or
purchase which involves the violation and within three years after the violation. 15 U.S.C. §
78cc(b). See Comment, supra note 9, at 288-90..
67. Compare Miley, 637 F.2d at 333, and Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 67981 (9th Cir. 1980), and Gordon v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 487 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974), and Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d
178, 180-83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966), and Mauriber, [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 99,444, at 96,530, and Russo v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 554 F. Supp.
613, 618-19 (N.D. I11.1982), and Klitzman v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 499 F. Supp.
255, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (no cause of actions exists), with Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 142 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969), and
Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 215, and Van Alen v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389,
403-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, 560 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1977). For further discussion on whether a
private cause of action exists, see Note, The Suitability Rule: Should a Private Right of Action
Exist?, 55 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 493 (1981); Roach, The Suitability Obligations of Brokers: Present Law and the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 29 HASTINGs L.J. 1067 (1978); Nichols,
supra note 12; Comment, supra note 9; 1975 Duiea L.J. 489.

68. The rule states:
Every member organization is required through a general partner or an officer who is a
holder of voting stock to
(1) Use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer, every
order, every cash or margin account accepted or carried by such organization and every
person holding power of attorney over any account accepted or carried by such
organizations.
(2) Supervise diligently all accounts handled by registered representatives of the
organization.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/2
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National Association of Security Dealers (NASD), section 2 of article
III of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice."9 The majority of decisions
deny -a private right of action on the basis that these are self-regulatory

rules designed for member use only and that no provision of the Securi70
ties Exchange Act creates a civil remedy for a violation of these rules.

In spite of this View, a few federal circuits permit a private cause of
action, in appropriate circumstances, where a customer alleges overreaching, misrepresentation, manipulation, or deception.71 In any case,
the NYSE and NASD rules may serve as standards against which to
assess the excessiveness of a broker's management of the customer's
7

account. 2

2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2,405 (1980).
69. The rule states:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a member
shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such
customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other
security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.
NASD SEC. DEALERS MANUAL (CCH) 1 2152 (1980). Compare the analogous provisions of the
proposed Federal Securities Code:
It is unlawful for a broker, dealer, municipal broker, or municipal dealer, in contravention
of the Commission's rules,
(3) to recommend a transaction in a security unless he reasonably believes that it is
not unsuitable for the customer on the basis of (A) information furnished by the customer
on reasonable inquiry with respect to his investment objectives, financial situation, and
needs, and (B) any other information known by the broker, dealer, municipal broker, or
municipal dealer.
FEDERAL SEC. CODE

§ 915(a)(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).

70. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 333; Jablon, 614 F.2d at 681; Gordon, 487 F.2d at 1263 Colonial Realty, 358 F.2d at 182; Mauriber, [Current) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,444, at 96,530;
Russo, 554 F. Supp. at 619; Klitzman, 499 F. Supp. at 259.
71. See Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 168 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977); Buttrey, 410 F.2d at 142; Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 215.
72. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 333; Mihara, 619 F.2d at 824. The literature concerning suitability is fairly expansive. See Allen, Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act for Violations of
Stock Exchange Rules, 25 Bus. LAW. 1493 (1970); Bines, Setting Investment Objectives: The
Suitability Doctrine (pts. I & II), 4 SEc. REG. L.J. 276 (1976), 4 SEc. REG. L.J. 418 (1977);
Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 1604 (1971); Fishman, BrokerDealer Obligations to Customers-The NASD Suitability Rule, 51 MINN. L. REv. 233 (1966);
Hoblin, A Stock Broker's Implied Liability to its Customers for Violation of a Rule of a Registered Stock Exchange, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 253 (1970); Lashbrooke, Implying a Cause of Action for Damages: Rule Violations by Registered Exchanges and Associations, 48 U. CIN. L.
REV. 949 (1979); Lowenfels, Implied Liability Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 12 (1966); Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets:
Implied Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 633 (1966); MacLean, Broker's
Liability for Violation of Exchange and NASD Rules, 47 DEN. L.J. 63 (1970); Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445;
Nichols, The Broker's Duty to His Customer Under Evolving Federal Fiduciary and Suitability
Standards, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 435 (1977); Rediker, Civil Liability of Broker-Dealers Under
SEC and NASD Suitability Rules, 22 ALA. L. RaV. 15 (1969); Roach, The Suitability Obligations ofby
Brokers:
Present Law
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Since 1982, a few injured customers have sought relief for churning under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO). a While RICO provides primarily for criminal actions, section
1964(c) 74 establishes a private right of action for treble damages, costs,
and attorney's fees to anyone injured by reason of a violation of the Act
including fraud in the sale of securities. 7a The purpose of RICO is to

eradicate organized crime and to provide penalties and remedies to deal
with the unlawful activities of organized crime members.7 The remedial purposes of RICO are to be construed liberally7 7 and have been
applied to persons other than members of organized crime.7 s However,

(1978); Shipman, Two Current Questions Concerning Implied Private Rights of Action Under the
Exchange Act, 17 W. RESERVE L. REV. 925 (1966); Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange
Member: Liabilityfor Violation of Stock Exchange Rules, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1120 (1970); 83
HARV. L. REV. 603 (1970); 83 HARV. L. REV. 825 (1970); 8 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 151 (1975); 55
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 493 (1981); 24 Sw. L.J. 384 (1970); 44 TUL. L. REV. 633 (1970); 1969 U.
ILL. L.F. 551; 121 U. PA. L. REV. 388 (1972); 22 VILL. L. REV. 130 (1976).
73. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See Mauriber v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V 99,444 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Noland v. Gurley,
566 F. Supp. 210 (D. Colo. 1983); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D.
Cal. 1982); Landmark Say. & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1981). See also 95
HARV. L. REV. 1101 (1982); Comment, Reading the "Enterprise" Element Back Into RICO:
Sections 1962 and 1964(c), 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 100 (1981); Blakely & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53
TEMP.

L.Q. 1009 (1980).

The Harperdecision provides one of the more complete analyses of RICO as it should apply
to churning cases. The court began its analysis by highlighting the more pertinent RICO
provisions:
The substantive provisions of RICO prohibit the following activities:
(1) The use of income or proceeds from a pattern of racketeering activity by a
principal in that activity to acquire an interest in or to establish an enterprise
engaged in interstate commerce. Section 1962(a).
(2) Acquisition of an interest in or control of an enterprise engaged in interstate
commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity. Section 1962(b).
(3) Operation of an interest engaged in interstate commerce through a pattern of
racketeering activity. Section 1962(c).
(4) Conspiracy to commit any of the above activities. Section 1962(d).
Harper, 545 F. Supp. at 1004 (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d)).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976) states that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee."
75. See Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 216-17; Harper, 545 F. Supp. at 1004; Note, supra note
73, at 1101-02. Section 1961(1) provides that fraud in the sale of securities constitutes racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose (1976). See
also Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 217; Harper, 545 F. Supp. at 1004; Note, supra note 73, at 1101.
77. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 Liberal Construction of Provisions (1976). See also Noland, 566
F. Supp. at 217; Harper, 545 F. Supp. at 1005-06.
78. See United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom.
Phillips v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 456 (1983); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/2
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the majority of courts dealing with the problem of churning have denied the use of RICO as a means of relief. 7 ' These courts reason that
the act of churning is not within the spirit of the purposes to which
RICO is directed.8 0 These courts also reason that sufficient remedies
are available under federal and state securities laws and state common
law.8 1 Finally, it is thought that no evidence exists to suggest that
RICO was meant to preempt or supplement the remedies provided by
these securities laws. 2
A number of actions based upon state law have been alleged by
customers injured by their brokers' churning activities. Among these
83
are breach of the broker's fiduciary duty to his or her customer, common-law fraud, 8 misrepresentation," negligence,8 6 and violations of
the antifraud provisions of the state securities laws.8" Assuming that

1975), cert. denied sub nom. Grancich v. United States, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v.
Gibson, 486 F. Supp. 1230 (S.D. Ohio 1980), affid, 675 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1982).
79. See, e.g., Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 218; Harper, 545 F. Supp. at 1006-07.
The Harper court noted that while RICO provisions as a whole have been liberally construed,
a number of courts have construed the
treble damage provision [§ 1964(c)] more narrowly than a broad reading of the provision
would suggest. These courts, relying on legislative history, parallels to antitrust law, and
policy considerations, have held that treble damages should not be available to plaintiffs
whose sole injury stems from the predicate acts of racketeering.
Harper, 545 F. Supp. at 1006. The Harper court adopted this view and held that "a plaintiff must
allege some [racketeering] injury 'by reason of a violation of § 1962' in order to have standing to
bring an action for treble damages under RICO." Id. at 1006. See Van Schaick v. Church of
Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1135-39 (D. Mass. 1982); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp.,
1981); Landmark Say. & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206,
526 F. Supp. 736, 746-48 (N.D. Ill.
208-09 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp.
256, 259 (E.D. La. 1981); Note, supra note 73, at 1105-14 (1982). But see Mauriber, [Current]
99,444, at 99,531-32. The court in Mauriber held that requiring a
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
racketeering injury is not consistent with the legislative history of RICO nor founded upon the
statutory language. Id.
80. See Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 218; Van Schaick, 535 F. Supp. at 1138; Adair, 526 F.
Supp. at 747; Waterman, 527 F. Supp. at 260.
81. See Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 218; Harper, 545 F. Supp. at 1007; Van Schaick, 535 F.
Supp. at 1138; Adair, 526 F. Supp. at 747; Waterman, 527 F. Supp. at 259-60.
82. See, e.g., Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 218; Harper, 545 F. Supp. at 1007.
83. See, e.g., Miley, 637 F.2d at 325 n.6, 329.
84. See Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 388, 389
(E.D. Mo. 1983); Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 578 (E.D. Cal.
1982); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 847-48 (E.D. Va. 1968). The Stevens court held the plaintiff to a stricter standard of proof than the three elements of a federal
securities law violation by requiring proof by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. 288 F. Supp.
at 848.
85. See Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 214; Surman, 559 F. Supp. at 389; Cunningham, 550 F.
Supp. at 578.
86. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Raymond, James & Ass'n, 642 F.2d 791, 792 (5th Cir. 1981);
Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 578.
87. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 325 n.6; Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 215; Surman, 559 F. Supp. at
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these state claims arise from the same common nucleus of operative
facts from which the federal claims derive, the federal court generally
exercises pendent jurisdiction over the state claims.88 Furthermore,
proof of the three requisite elements of a federal securities law churning violation generally will enable the injured customer to hold the broker liable for breach of fiduciary duty89 and common-law fraud."0 The
customer should be careful, however, to plead and prove the alleged
state claims as defined by the applicable state law. The advantage of
pleading and proving a state action is that, unlike under the federal
securities acts, 91 an action at common law may be used as a basis for
recovery of punitive damages. 9"
Customers have also sought relief from the "deeper pocket" of the
brokerage firm for the acts of its broker. 93 Several theories of recovery
have been attempted. A number of courts permit the imposition of aiding and abetting liability against a brokerage firm based on section
10(b) and rule 10b-5." To establish aiding and abetting liability, the

88. See infra notes 195-256 and accompanying text.
89. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 324. In Miley, the court stated "[a]dditionally, upon proving the
three requisite elements of a federal securities law churning violation, the investor will, in most or
perhaps all cases, be entitled to hold the broker liable under a pendent state claim for breach of
fiduciary duty." Id.
One of the required elements is control of.the account by the broker. This control creates a
fiduciary relationship between the broker and customer. The broker has a duty to properly advise
and manage transactions for the customer. If the broker abuses this duty by churning the customer's account, the broker may be liable for breach of the fiduciary duty. See id. at 324-25;
Comment, supra note 9, at 282.
90. See Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1024; Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 847-48. These courts recognize, however, that the standard of proof for common-law fraud may require clear and convincing
evidence as opposed to the preponderance of evidence required under a § 10(b) and rule lOb-5
action. Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1024; Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 847-48.
A claim of misrepresentation may be difficult to establish under state law. The plaintiff may
allege misrepresentation on the basis that the broker held himself or herself out to the public with
the implied promise to carry out his or her services in a fair and good-faith manner. This implied
promise of good faith is generally known as the "shingle theory." Under this theory, the broker
commits misrepresentation in a churning situation by failing to act in good faith and to advise the
cuttomer of the excessive transactions. See Note, supra note 1, at 870; Comment, supra note 9, at
293. See generally supra note 47.
For a presentation of the distinctions between common-law and federal securities law fraud,
see L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURmES REGULATION 799-817 (1983); N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS
2.02 (1977).
91. See infra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 182-94 and accompanying text.
93. See Rolf, 570 F.2d at 44-48; Armstrong, 699 F.2d at 90-92; Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman
& Co. Commodities, 688 F.2d 1193, 1198 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1982); Mauriber, [Current] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,444, at 96,529-30; Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 219-20; Kaufman v. Magid, 539
F. Supp. 1088, 1095-96 (D. Mass. 1982); Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,419, at 92,509-10 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 12, 1982).
94. See Rolf, 570 F.2d at 44-48; Armstrong, 699 F.2d at 90-92; Karlen, 688 F.2d at 1198
& n.5; Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 219-20; Kaufman, 539 F. Supp. at 1095-96. See generally S.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/2
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customer first must prove that the primary party-the broker-committed a securities law violation. 5 Next, the customer must
show a sufficient level of scienter on the part of the brokerage firm. 6
Proof of an intent to defraud or reckless disregard for the customer's
interests satisfies the scienter requirement.9 7 The final requirement to
establish aiding and abetting liability is proof of substantial assistance
on the part of the brokerage firm in the fraudulent mismanagement of
the customer's account." "Substantial assistance" may include repeated misrepresentations by acting as a conduit to accumulate or distribute securities, executing transactions, investing proceeds, or financing transactions." Failure to learn of or disclose the fraud committed
by the broker may also support a finding of "substantial assistance"
against the brokerage firm.100
Under section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193411 and
section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933,102 customers may allege that
the brokerage firm is jointly and severally liable as "controlling persons" of the broker who committed the churning violation.10 3 Sections
20 and 15 impose joint and several liability on persons who control

§ 9.03 (1977 & Supp. 1983); L. Loss, supra
note 90, at 1182-89.
95. See Rolf, 570 F.2d at 47; Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1975);
JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS

SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 908 (1975). Cf.
Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (required
independent wrong).
96. See. e.g., Rolf, 570 F.2d at 44.
97. See id.at 44-47; Armstrong, 699 F.2d at 91; Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 219-20; Kaufman, 539 F. Supp. at 1096.
98. See Rolf, 570 F.2d at 48; Armstrong, 699 F.2d at 91.
99. Rolf, 570 F.2d at 48.
100. Id.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976) states:
[e]very person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of
this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting
the violation or cause of action.
Section 20 is used far more frequently than § 15 of the 1933 Act as a basis for "controlling
persons" liability.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976) states:
[e]very person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who; pursuant
to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or more other persons by
or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under sections
77k or 771 of this title, shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent
as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the
controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of
the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
103. Rolf,570 F.2d at 48 & n.17; Mauriber,[Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,444,
at 96,529-30; Liskey, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,419, at
92,509-10.
See generally1983
S. JAFFE, supra note 94, at § 9.02;L. Loss, supra note 90, at 1179-82.
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others who have violated substantive provisions of the securities acts. 1 ''
While "controlling" is not defined by the statutes, liability obviously
may be established by proof that a person (broker) acted under the
direction of the controlling person (brokerage firm) in an employer-employee relationship. 105 Section 15 permits a controlling person to escape
liability by proving that it had no knowledge of nor reasonable grounds
to believe the existence of the facts which allegedly establish the liability of the controlled person.'0 6 Likewise, section 20 permits a complete
defense for the brokerage firm if it can show that it acted in good faith
and did not induce the acts constituting the violation of federal law.107
Section 15 requires the customer to prove the "controlling person" had
a state of mind of something more than mere negligence. 08 In a section
20 "controlling person" violation, the burden of proving good faith
shifts to the brokerage firm once the customer establishes that the broker completed the transactions through the employing brokerage firm
and the brokerage firm received a commission on the transaction. 10 ' To
establish "good faith," the brokerage firm must show, at least, that it
has not been negligent in supervision and that it maintained and enforced a reasonable and proper system of supervision and internal con0
trol over the broker."
Common-law respondeat superior may also be an available theory
to impute vicarious liability upon the brokerage firm. 1 This theory of
recovery is more plaintiff-oriented than the "controlling persons" theory because scienter is not required and the good-faith exception is not
permitted."' To recover under respondeat superior, the customer must
prove that the broker's misconduct occurred in the course of the broker's employment and that the brokerage firm received profits from the
fraudulent transactions." s There is a split of authority among the fed104.
105.
106.
694 (6th
107.

See, e.g., Mauriber, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,444, at 96,529-30.
See. e.g., Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 220.
See 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690,
Cir. 1976); Mauriber, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,444, at 96,529-30.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976); Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388, 394

(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Mauriber, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

99,444, at 96,530; Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 220; Liskey, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,419, at 92,509.
108.

See Mauriber, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

99,444, at 96,529-30.

109. See, e.g., Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980).
110. See id.

111. See id. See also Holloway, 536 F.2d at 695; Mauriber, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 99,444, at 96,529; Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 221; Liskey, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,419, at 92,509-10.
112. See Kohn, 620 F.2d at 716; Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 221; Liskey, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,419, at 92,509-10.
113. See, e.g., Liskey, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder]
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/2
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eral circuits whether section 20 supplants the doctrine of respondeat
superior and provides the sole theory of vicarious liability. 14 The majority view holds that section 20 does not supplant the doctrine of respondeat superior. 1 5 This view holds that there is no warrant for believing section 20 was intended to narrow the remedies available to
customers.1 6 In fact, under both the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the law
states that the rights and remedies provided shall be in addition to any
and all rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity. 17 Further, neither Act was intended to insulate a brokerage firm from liability under common-law agency principles.1 1 8 Moreover, the brokerage
firm has an affirmative duty to prevent the use of the prestige of the
firm to defraud the investing public. 1 9
III.
A.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES

Calculation or Speculation?

In the typical churning case, the customer complains that the broker excessively traded his or her account and/or purchased unsuitable
securities, given the customer's investment interests.12 0 While the sole
gain to the broker in this situation is the excessive commissions generated, the broker's misconduct causes two distinct harms to the
1 21
customer.
First, the customer suffers by having to pay the excessive commissions. 2 2 The breach of both the federal securities laws and the bro-

92,509-10.
114. Compare Kohn, 629 F.2d at 716, and Holloway, 536 F.2d at 694-95, and Noland, 566
F. Supp. at 221, and Liskey, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,419, at
92,509 (§ 20 does not supplant respondeat superior) with Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129,
1132-33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975) (§ 20 does supplant the doctrine of respondeat superior). See Comment, A Comparison of Control Person Liability and Respondeat Superior: Section 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 CAL. W.L. REv. 152 (1979).
115. See Kohn, 629 F.2d at 716; Holloway, 536 F.2d at 694-95; Liskey, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,419, at 92,509-10; Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 221.
116. See Kohn, 629 F.2d at 716; Holloway, 536 F.2d at 695; Liskey, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,419, at 92,509-10.
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976), which states in pertinent part: "The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that
may exist at law or in equity ....
See also Kohn, 629 F.2d at 716; Noland, 566 F. Supp. at 221.
118. See Karlen, 688 F.2d at 1198 n.5; Holloway, 536 F.2d at 695. The Holloway court
stated that the provisions in the 1933 Act and 1934 Act "were not intended to preempt the operation of the doctrine of respondeat superior in a case involving unlawful activities of a brokerage
firm's employees." Id.
119. Holloway, 536 F.2d at 696; Liskey, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 98,419, at 92,510.
120. Brodsky, supra note 8, at 159.
121. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 1981).
122. Id. See Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 826 (9th Cir. 1980). The customer's account may have been excessively traded in types of stocks that met the customer's
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ker's fiduciary duty entitle the customer to receive the commissions and
interest paid as a result of the excessive trading, 121 perhaps along with
the capital gains taxes incurred as a result of the churning. 2 4 This
compensation is due the customer regardless of whether the customer's
account has increased or decreased in value.1 25
Second, the customer is harmed by the decline in his or her account due to the unsuitable trading conducted by the broker.12" The
decline in the value of the customer's account represents the customer's
trading loss-a compensable violation unrelated to the amount of commissions paid to the broker.127 To calculate the customer's trading loss,
the actual performance of the customer's account may be compared to
a hypothetical, well-managed account similar in nature to the customer's account." 8
In theory, the customer should be fully compensated for the twin
harms of excessive commissions paid and trading losses incurred. 29
However, calculating damages which would fully compensate the customer without being unduly speculative at the expense of the broker is
a difficult task which*has resulted in mixed and confused damage
awards. 30 Courts have been especially plagued with the task of awarding trading losses due to unsuitable transactions.'8 1 Determining a precise award of trading loss is made difficult by the unified nature of the
churning violation and the volatile nature of the stock market.' While
the damage calculation may be difficult, it might be argued that this
risk of uncertainty should be borne by the broker-wrongdoer and not
the injured customer. 33 Further, the judiciary's responsibility to set
objectives. Thus no claim of unsuitability is available. See also Brodsky, supra note 8, at 159.
123. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 326; Mihara, 619 F.2d at 826.
124. See Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 851-52 (E.D. Va. 1968)
(only permitted recovery of commissions, capital gains taxes incurred, and state transfer tax paid).
The customer may also miss dividends due to excessive trading. Nichols, supra note 12, at 445.
See generally Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 259 (4th Cir. 1975).
125. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 326.
126. Id. See also Brodsky, supra note 8, at 159; Nichols, supra note 12, at 445.
127. See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1039 (1978); Miley, 637 F.2d at 326.
128. See Note, supra note 1, at 886; Brodsky, supra note 8, at 165-66. See also Rolf, 570
F.2d at 49-50; Miley, 637 F.2d at 328; Nichols, supra note 12, at 445.
129. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 327; Brodsky, supra note 8, at 158-59.
130. Miley, 637 F.2d at 327; Brodsky, supra note 8, at 158-59. Accord McNeal v. Paine,
Webber, Jackson, & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888, 894 n.14 (5th Cir. 1979) (as amended).
131. Miley, 637 F.2d at 327; Brodsky, supra note 8, at 159.
132. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 327; Carras, 516 F.2d at 259. In Carras, the court, while
recognizing the need to fully compensate the customer for lost equity, felt compelled because of
the excessive degree of churning and unstable market to limit damages to the ascertainable losses
of commissions, service charges, and taxes attributable to the excessive trading. Id.
133. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 1970) (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Accord Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman & Co. Commodities, 688 F.2d 1193, 1202 (8th
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/2
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fair and reasonable damages should not be abdicated because of the
difficulty or imprecision of calculating the damages. 3
Some courts, however, refuse to award trading loss damages because such an award is viewed as speculative and conjectural. 136 The
fallacy in awarding trading losses, these courts argue, is that even properly managed, conservative accounts may lose value in a given period.' By imposing trading loss damages, the broker is thereby held to
a higher standard than should be expected. 3 1 Trading loss damages
would amount to the awarding of punitive damages under the guise of
compensatory damages.' 38
In short, the courts are not in agreement with the proper award of
damages when a broker churns unsuitable securities in a customer's
account.' 3 9 The better view, however, permits an award of damages for
the excessive commissions churned and the trading losses attributable
to unsuitable transactions. 4 0 This loss-of-bargain method provides the
injured customer compensation for both of the harms proximately
caused by the broker and is based upon an objective formula which
4
prohibits undue speculation at the expense of the broker.' '
B.

Miley-Rolf Formula: Loss of Bargain

This formula, adopted to date by the Second and Fifth Circuits,
compensates a customer for excessive commissions and trading
losses.1 42 To approximate trading losses, the formula compares the actual performance of the customer's account with the estimated per-

Cir. 1982).
134. Miley, 637 F.2d at 327. See generally Brodsky, supra note 8, at 158-59.
135. See. e.g., Carras, 516 F.2d at 259; Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 849.
136. See Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 849.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Brodsky, supra note 8, at 157.
140. Id. at 158-59. See Note, supra note 1, at 885-86.
141. Miley, 637 F.2d at 328-29. See Brodsky, supra note 8, at 160-61; Note, supra note 1,
at 885.
142. Rolf, 570 F.2d at 49-50; Miley, 637 F.2d at 328-29. In Rolf, the Second Circuit
remanded the case to the district court to determine damages for trading losses as well as excessive commissions paid and interest thereon according to the formula it devised. Rolf, 570 F.2d at
48. The court also requested the district court to reconsider the issue of prejudgment interest since
it was obvious that Rolf had lost a principal sum. Id. at 50.
In Miley, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the jury award of $54,000 in compensatory damages.
Miley, 637 F.2d at 326. The district judge permitted recovery for both commissions and interest
paid as a result of excessive trading, and the trading loss from unsuitable trading by the broker
resulting in a decline in the value of the customer's portfolio in excess of the average decline in the
stock market. Id. The Miley-Rolf formula can be used to assess damages for a section 10(b)
violation as well as for a state claim such as breach of the broker's fiduciary duty to the customer.
See id. at 329.
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formance of a suitable account free of broker misconduct. 143 In the
absence of a specialized account, the estimation of the suitable account
is pegged to the average percentage performance in the value of the
Dow Jones Industrials Index, Standard and Poor's Index, or another
recognized index of value during the churning period. 144 The formula
for determining the loss-of-bargain damages consists of two distinct
components:
Churning Damage Award, in an amount equal to commissisons
and interest paid as a result of excessive trading; 145 and
(B) Trading Loss Damage, derived by
(1) calculating the original market value of the customer's investment and dividends at the point unsuitable trading began;146
(2) subtracting the value of the customer's account on the date
the broker's misconduct ceased, to arrive at the Gross Economic Loss (GEL); 47
(3) subtracting from the GEL the average percentage decline in
the value of the Dow Jones Industrials, Standard and Poor's
Index, another well-recognized index of value, or a combination of indices for the period of misconduct; 48 and
(4) subtracting any withdrawals made by the customer during the
misconduct period and any settlements or awards for the
49
same unsuitable transactions received from other sources.'
(A)

The Miley-Rolf formula was announced in a "bear market" period; the value of the GEL was thus adjusted for a declining stock market. 16 0 To adapt this formula for a "bull" or upswing market period,
the average percentage increase in the value of the index during the
misconduct period should be added to the GEL.' 5 ' A further improve-

143. See Rolf, 570 F.2d at 49; Miley, 637 F.2d at 328.
144. See Rolf, 570 F.2d at 49; Miley, 637 F.2d at 328. The district court has the discretion
to select a more case-oriented gauge by using a specialized portfolio, a selective portion of an
index, or a different method shown by one of the parties to be more accurate than a recognized
index. See Rolf, 570 F.2d at 49 n.22; Miley, 637 F.2d at 328.
145. See Rolf, 570 F.2d at 50; Miley, 637 F.2d at 326-28. A court may also decide to
permit an award of capital gains taxes incurred due to churning as well as other state transfer
taxes paid on the excessive trading. See, e.g., Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 850-51.
146. See Rolf, 570 F.2d at 49. In a case such as Rolf where a dealer-supervisor is charged
with aiding and abetting, the point at which the aiding and abetting began may be after the point
unsuitable trading began by the broker or advisor. Id. at 49 n.20.
147. Rolf, 570 F.2d at 49 n.21.
148. Rolf, 570 F.2d at 49 & n.22; Miley, 637 F.2d at 328.
149. See Rolf, 570 F.2d at 49-50. This portion of the formula in Rolf was combined with
(B)(I), but has been separated to permit a more logical application of the formula.
150. See. e.g., Rolf, 570 F.2d at 49 n.22. A bear market is "[a] market in which prices are
falling or expected to fall." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 140 (5th ed. 1979). See generally THE
Dow JONES AVERAGES 1885-1980 (P. Pierce ed. 1982).
151. A bull market is a "[slecurities term for a market in which prices are rising or are
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/2
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ment on the Miley-Rolf formula would permit the customer to attempt
to establish, through the use of expert testimony, the performance of a

hypothetical, properly managed account suited to the customer's investment interests. 15 2 This hypothetical account's performance would be
compared to the GEL rather than using the average percentage change
in the value of the suggested indices in (B)(3) above.' 5 3 The Miley
decision indicated that the Fifth Circuit would be receptive to this

if the customer can demonstrate that this method
method of calculation
54
accurate.1
more
is
This formula has been criticized for permitting speculative and
conjectural damages as well as for ignoring the fact that many wellmanaged accounts suffer losses even in a bull market. " The use of a
broad-based index fails to consider whether the index as a whole is

similar to the securities in the broker's account. 156 In response to the
broad-based index criticism, the Miley-Rolf formula permits the district judge to use his or her discretion to select a more appropriate
gauge of stock valuation."
Overall, the Miley-Rolf formula is a logical approach to compen-

sate the customer for churning and trading losses. While it is not a
precise theory, it does provide sufficient guidelines to reduce the risk of
windfalls.' 5 8 Further, the formula attempts to set a ceiling on damages

by preventing speculation on other harms, not included in the formula,
which a jury might feel are caused by the broker's misconduct. "
The customer must prepare his or her evidence carefully in order
to successfully present the Miley-Rolf formula for recovery.

60

The use

BLACK'S LAw.DICTIONARY 177 (5th ed. 1979).
Adding the percentage increase in the value of the index during an upswing market period
permits the customer to recover the amount that an account without misconduct would have naturally earned.
152. See Brodsky, supra note 8, at 165-66; Note, supra note 1, at 885-86. Using a hypothetical account with proper management permits potentially larger trading loss damages than the
more static account concept adopted by the Miley-Rolf formula. Compare Brodsky, supra note 8,
at 165-66 with Rolf, 570 F.2d at 49.
153. See Brodsky, supra note 8, at 165-66.
154. Miley, 637 F.2d at 328. See also Rolf, 570 F.2d at 49 n.22 (the Second Circuit may
also be receptive to a more appropriate method of calculation).
155. See, e.g., Carras, 516 F.2d at 259; Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 849.
156. See Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 849.
157. Rolf, 570 F.2d at 49 n.22; Miley, 637 F.2d at .328.
158. Miley, 637 F.2d at 329. Since many of the churning cases arise within the jurisdiction
of the Second Circuit, the Miley-Rolf formula will likely be used often in the resolution of these
cases. See Brodsky, supra note 8, at 161.
159. Miley, 637 F.2d at 329. The formula prohibits the jury from speculating on possible
harms such as emotional suffering. But cf.Emmons v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 532 F. Supp. 480, 485 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (punitive damages based on state court claims in a
churning action may include recovery for the infliction of mental distress).
160. See, e.g., Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1374-75 (7th Cir. 1983). In

expected to rise."
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of a summary chart of exhibits to prove the commissions paid
ing loss suffered is as indispensable to the customer's case
testimony.1 6 ' The more cohesive and organized the damage
the more likely the customer will be adequately compensated
her injuries.

C.
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and tradas expert
evidence,
for his or

Other Forms of Recovery

1. Out-of-Pocket
The out-of-pocket approach calculates the difference between the
value of the customer's account and dividends at the beginning of the
misconduct period, and the value of the account returned to the customer at the end of the period less any withdrawals made by the customer. 62 The difference arrived at is the total amount of damages
awarded to the customer.'
This approach has been criticized for ignoring the possibility that
losses may be due not to the churning, but rather to an overall decline
in the market.1" Thus, in a declining market, this formula awards
windfall damages to the customer.'" Further, even a well-managed acCostello, the court criticized the plaintiff for attempting to characterize his loss as a "realized"
loss problem. Id. at 1374. A "realized" loss is determined upon sale while market loss is determined by comparing the original value of stock to the current market value. Id.
161. See, e.g., id. at 1375. The court noted that, unlike the typical churning case involving a
unified offense, the plaintiff in this case claimed specific trades constituted the churning violation.
The court chastised the plaintiff for dumping massive amounts of raw data upon the court that
were "fairly sophisticated and specialized in nature, using financial terms and notations surely
beyond the ken of the average juror as well as [the court]." Id. at 1375. The court complained
that "no ... expert testimony, nor even any helpful summary of the exhibits was introduced." Id.
The court stated that it was highly unrealistic that the jury could properly assimilate the
information and use it as a basis for awarding damages for realized losses. It held that the plaintiff failed to properly establish proof of damages to support a recovery of realized losses and,
thereby, reduced the judgment awarded to an amount equal to the commissions paid during the
churning period. Id. However, the court provided that the plaintiff could elect to vacate the judgment and proceed with a new trial on the issue of churning and the damages incurred by the
plaintiff. Id. '
162. See. e.g., Karlen, 688 F.2d at 1201-02; Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc.,
262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 730-33 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 249-51 (1968). See also Note, supra note 1, at
884-85; Brodsky, supra note 8, at 161-62; Comment, supra note 9, at 298-99.
163. See Karlen, 688 F.2d at 1201; Twomey, 262 Cal. App. 2d at 730, 69 Cal. Rptr. at
249. In Karlen, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the out-of-pocket award of damages in the amount of
$92,474.50. The court found that the defendant failed to object to the substance of the jury instructions on damages before they were submitted to the jury and was thereby prohibited from
raising such an objection on appeal. Karlen, 688 F.2d at 1201. In Twomey, the Court of Appeals
of California upheld an out-of-pocket award of $32,356.71 in spite of the fact that part of the loss
may have been due to overall market decline. Twomey, 262 Cal. App. 2d at 730-33, 69 Cal. Rptr.
at 249-51.
164. See, e.g., Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 849-50; Brodsky, supra note 8, at 162; Note, supra
note 1, at 884-85.
165. See, e.g., Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 849-50; Note, supra note 1, at 884.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/2
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count in a steady or increasing market may depreciate without misconduct.166 As well, if the account still maintains a net profit at the end of
the misconduct period, the out-of-pocket formula would theoretically
permit no damages. 6 7 However, this ignores the probability that, without churning violations, the net profit figure would have been much
greater.168 The Securities and Exchange Commission consistently refuses to permit the broker to use net profit as a defense. 16 9
2. Quasi-Contractual and Variations
The basic quasi-contractual theory of recovery requires the broker
to return the excessive commissions churned plus interest thereon.1 70
This was one of the earlier methods of calculating damages in churning
cases.17 1 The decisions awarding quasi-contractual damages adopted
the limited view that the amount of excessive commissions was the only
harm proximately caused by the broker. 7 2 The fallacy of this view is
that it overlooks the harm caused by inappropriate or unsuitable transactions managed by the broker resulting in trading losses.' 73 Trading
losses are as significant a harm to the customer as excessive commissions and7 4the customer deserves adequate compensation for these losses
as well.1
A variation on the basic quasi-contractual remedy permits the customer to recover the capital gains tax that the customer was required
to pay due to the churning misconduct, in addition to the excessive
commissions and interest.175 The justification for awarding the capital
gains taxes paid is that "but for" the churning, the sales from the excessive transactions would not have been made and the taxes not intransactions may
curred. 17 6 State transfer taxes paid on the excessive
77
rationale.1
same
the
under
recovered
be
also
166.

See Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 849.

167. See Comment, supra note 9, at 298-99.
168. See Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 849-50; Comment, supra note 9, at 299.
169. See Note, supra note 1, at 878. See also Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 849-50.
170. See, e.g., Costello, 711 F.2d at 1375; Hecht, 430 F.2d at 1211-12 (the court refused
any other damages due to churning because the plaintiff was found to have waived the claim of
unsuitabilty and was thereby estopped from trading loss damages).
171. See, e.g., Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co., [1964-1965 Transfer Binder] FED SEC. L.
91,621 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1965). See generally Note, supra note 1, at 883-84
REP. (CCH)
(Newkirk was the only churning case which, at that time, had awarded damages).
172. See, 'e.g., Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 850.
173. See Brodsky, supra note 8, at 161. See also Miley, 637 F.2d at 326.
174. See Rolf, 570 F.2d at 48-50; Miley, 637 F.2d at 326.
175. See tarras, 516 F.2d at 259; Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 850-51.
176. See Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 850-51; Brodsky, supra note 8, at 162.
177. See Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 851. New York State imposed a transfer tax on the
securities when they were sold or transferred from one person to another on the New York Stock
Exchange.
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While this variation provides additional compensation to the customer, it also ignores the harm of trading loss. Both the basic theory
and the variation fail to adequately compensate the customer for the
harm proximately caused by the broker's misconduct.17 8
D.

Punitive Damages

Punitive damages may not be awarded under the federal securities

provisions section 10(b) or rule lOb-5.'7 9 Section 28(a) of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits recovery in excess of actual damages
demonstrated. 180 This section is construed to prohibit the award of nonpecuniary damages including punitive damages. 18 ' However, it is well
established that punitive or exemplary damages may be awarded if permitted by state law and a state law violation is joined to the federal

securities violation. 82 State law violations such as breach of fiduciary
duty and fraud or reckless disregard of the customer's interests in his
or her account have been held to give rise to punitive damages in the
churning context. 83

Exemplary damages may be awarded against both the broker
and the brokerage firm if the customer establishes the requisite elements under state law.' 84 Generally, the evidence necessary to establish

the scienter requirement under a 10b'-5 churning case is also sufficient
to support an award of punitive damages under state law.' 85 Some state

common-law actions may require the customer to show actual malice,
fraud, or oppression to recover punitive damages. 86
The Miley court devised a formula for judging the excessiveness of

178. See, e.g., Miley, 637 F.2d at 326-29.
179. See. e.g., Juster v. Rothschild, Unterberg & Towbin, 554 F. Supp. 331, 334 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Emmons, 532 F. Supp. at 485; Millas v. L.F. Rothschild, Unterberg & Towbin, [19811982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V 98,441, at 92,617 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 1982);
Nye v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1200 (8th Cir. 1978); Carras, 516 F.2d at
259-60.
180. 15 U.S.C. § 77bb (1976). The statute prohibits recovery of "a total amount in excess
of actual damages." Id.
181. See, e.g., Carras, 516 F.2d at 259-60; Emmons, 532 F. Supp. at 485.
182. See Petrites v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 646 F.2d 1033, 1036 (5th Cir. 1981); Miley, 637
F.2d at 329; Nye, 588 F.2d at 1200; Juster, 554 F. Supp. at 334; Emmons, 532 F. Supp. at 485;
Millas, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,441, at 92,617.
183. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 330-31. But see Mihara, 619 F.2d at 825-26 (the court determined state law required more than a showing of breach of fiduciary duty; malice or actual fraud
must be established to recover punitive damages). Mihara, 619 F.2d at 825-26.
184. See Comment, Punitive Damages and the Federal Securities Act: Recovery via Pendent Jurisdiction, 47 Miss. L.J. 743, 759-63 (1976); Comment, The Reappearance of Punitive
Damages in Private Actions for Securities Fraud, 5 TEx. TECH L. REv. 111, 126-39 (1973). See
also Mihara, 619 F.2d at 826.
185. See, e.g., Miley, 637 F.2d at 330.
186. See, e.g., Mihara, 619 F.2d at 825.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/2

1983]

CHURNING IN SECURITIES

an award of punitive damages in a churning case. 18 7 Three times the
compensatory damage award was selected by that court as an appropriate benchmark for significant business torts.1 a8 The compensatory
damage component of this formula is properly limited to the broker's
gain from churning: the unjust commissions generated by the excessive
transactions."'
Other courts indicate that larger awards of punitive damages as
compared to compensatory damages would be appropriate.190 This
more expansive view seems especially justifiable when assessing punitive damages against a brokerage firm. A larger award is necessary to
serve as an appropriate punishment against a firm that generates a
large dollar volume.191
At least one district court permits not only punitive damages, but

also damages for mental distress to be recovered if allowable under
state law and if state violations are pendent to a federal securities
claim. 1 "9This case involved Ohio law which permits punitive damages

1
for malicious fraud and intentional infliction of mental distress. " The
court held that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the proper elements

under Ohio law to entitle him to offer proof at trial to recover exemplary damages for fraud and infliction of emotional distress.1 94
IV.
A.

DEFENSE TACTICS

Arbitration:Severance and Arbitration of Pendent State Claims

In the standard investment account contract, the customer often
agrees to clauses providing for arbitration in the event of any controversies arising out of the account.19 5 While the stated purpose of in-

187. Miley, 637 F.2d at 331-32.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 332. The broker's gain from his churning misconduct consists of the excessive
commissions. In order to appropriately punish the broker, punitive damages ought to correspond to
the amount of gain taken by the broker. Id.
190. See, e.g., Mihara, 619 F.2d at 826.
191. Id.
192. Emmons, 532 F. Supp. at 485.
193. Id. See Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co. v. Scott, 58 Ohio St. 2d 282, 390 N.E.2d 320 (1979);
Logsdon v. Graham Ford Co., 54 Ohio St. 2d 336, 376 N.E.2d 1333 (1978) (damages for malicious fraud).
194. Emmons, 532 F. Supp. at 485.
195. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 335 (5th Cir. 1981); Cunningham v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 579 (E.D. Cal. 1982); Liskey v. Oppenheimer &
Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,419, at 92,508 (W.D. Okla.
Jan. 12, 1982).
Arbitration in the federal securities law context is discussed generally in S. JAFFE, BROKERDEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS ch. 17 (1977 & Supp. 1983); L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 1189-96 (1983); Krause, Securities Litigation: The Unsolved Problem
Agreements for Pendent Claims, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 693 (1980);
Arbitration1983
of Predispute
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cluding arbitration clauses is to provide for a cheaper and more efficient adjudication of disputes,'" brokers in reality urge inclusion and
enforcement of these provisions to reduce the chance of potentially
larger jury awards in favor of more conservative arbitration awards.
Notwithstanding this motivation for including arbitration as a standard
contract clause, these provisions have been viewed as valid and
97
binding.1
Pursuant to section 2 of the United States Arbitration Act, written
arbitration provisions are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" unless
there are grounds for revoking the arbitration agreement.1 98 The Arbitration Act was designed to compel the federal courts to recognize and
enforce arbitration agreements.' 9 9 Section 3 of this act mandates that
federal courts refer all arbitrable issues to arbitration as provided in
the agreement, and to stay the federal trial until arbitration is completed. 00 Applying the Arbitration Act literally would in effect refer
all clurning violations-both state and federal-to arbitration.2 0 '
A consensus of courts, however, recognizes that federal claims
arising under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are
not subject to arbitration because of Congress' intent to assure injured
parties the right to pursue relief for securities law violations in federal
court. 202 This concept of invalidating arbitration in favor of federal juNeville, The Enforcement of Arbitration Clauses in Investor-Broker Agreements, ARB. J., Mar.
1979, at 5; 65 CALIF. L. REV. 120 (1977); 62 YALE L.J. 985 (1953).
196. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1924); see also Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1981); Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 584; Krause,
supra note 195, at 693-94.
197. Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 579. See Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 645.
Note also the provisions of the proposed Federal Securities Code:
A purported waiver of compliance with this Code (as defined in section 225) or a rule of
recovery thereunder is void ....
[However, the language above] does not affect (1) a good faith settlement of, or
agreement to arbitrate, an existing dispute ... or (3) an advance agreement
(B) by any person to arbitrate a dispute arising under a rule of a self-regulatory organization (other than the Municipal Board), unless (i) a violation of the rule is a violation
of this Code .
FEDERAL SEC. CODE § 1725(a), (c) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
198. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
199. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 335; Sawyer v. Raymond, James & Assoc., Inc., 642 F.2d 791,
792 (5th Cir. 1981); Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 579, 584.
200. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1976).
201. See Cunninghan, 550 F. Supp. at 579-80.
202. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953); Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 643-44; Sawyer,
642 F.2d at 792; Miley, 637 F.2d at 334; Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017,
1030 (6th Cir. 1979); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 434
U.S. 824 (1977); Roueche v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 338, 339
(D. Hawaii 1983); Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 580; Baratta v. S.D. Cohn & Co., [1982-1983
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/2
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risdiction was first applied by the United States Supreme Court in
Wilko v. Swan. e3 The Wilko decision involved a violation of the Securities Act of 1933.204 The Court decided that, looking to Congress'
intent in the Securities Act to protect investors by forbidding waiver of
their rights, the Act would best be implemented through the invalidation of arbitration agreements. 05 Lower courts, recognizing that statutory language identical to that relied upon by the Wilko Court is found
in the 1934 Act, have urged Wilko as support for refusing to enforce
2 06
arbitration in claims arising under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.
Unresolved is the issue of jurisdiction over pendent state claims:
typically claims for common-law fraud, misrepresentation, or breach of
fiduciary duty. 07 Defendant-brokers have urged that these claims
2 0 8 Typically,
should be severed from the federal action and arbitrated.
brokers have requested either a stay of the federal action until arbitration of the state issues is completed, or simultaneous proceedings in
both federal court and in arbitration.'"° The federal circuits are divided
as to whether arbitration should be compelled in these state claims
under the mandate of the United States Arbitration Act.2 0
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,035, at 94,920 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 1982); Liskey, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,419, at 92,508; Rankl v. Stroud,
Suplee & Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,827, at 90,119-20 (E.D. Pa.
June 12, 1980).
203. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
204. Id. at 428. The plaintiff-customer filed an action against a securities brokerage firm to
recover damages for violation of § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428-29.
205. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
206. See, e.g., Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1030; Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 580.
207. See Sawyer, 642 F.2d at 792; Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1030; Sibley, 543 F.2d at 54243; Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 388, 390 (E.D. Mo.
1983); Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 580; Liskey, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 98,419, at 92,508.
208. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 334; Sawyer, 642 F.2d at 792; Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 641;
Sibley, 543 F.2d at 542; Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 578-79; Liskey, [1981-1982 Transfer
98,419, at 92,508.
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
209. See, e.g., Sibley, 543 F.2d at 542; Roueche, 554 F. Supp. at 339. But see Dickinson,
661 F.2d at 641 (defendant moved for arbitration of arbitrable claims, but requested that the
arbitration be stayed until federal resolution of the non-arbitrable claims); Liskey, [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,419, at 92,508 (the defendant argued that the
court should sever the state claims, order arbitration of these claims, but-to simplify matters-stay the arbitration until after the federal trial).
210. Compare Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981), and Sawyer v.
Raymond, James & Ass'n, 642 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1981), and Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 534 F.2d
540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977), and Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1982), and Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REp. (CCH) 98,419 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 12, 1982), and Surman v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Mo. 1981) and Rankl v.
Stroud, Suplee & Co., [19811 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,827 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 1980)
(denying arbitration when impracticable to separate non-arbitrable federal claims from arbitrable
v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981), and Roueche v.
with Dickinson
state claims)
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A number of circuit courts recognize an exception to imposing ar-

bitration known as the doctrine of intertwining."' The Fifth Circuit
developed this theory in Sibley v. Tandy:
[W]hen it is impractical if not impossible to separate out non-arbitrable
federal securities law claims from arbitrable [state] claims, a court
should deny arbitration in order to preserve its exclusive jurisdiction over
federal securities act claims .... An arbitrator making a decision on the
common law claims would [be] impelled to review the same facts needed
to establish the plaintiff's securities law claim.""'

The intertwining theory permits the district court to exercise discretion
to refuse to order severance and arbitration if the case falls within the
parameters of the theory.' In general, the court must first determine
that all claims in the action involve the same series of occurrences and
would be resolved by consideration of the same factual and legal con-

clusions for both the federal and pendent state claims, based upon evidence common to both.' 4 Courts adopting the intertwining theory reason that arbitration would be inefficient and duplicative as well as
inconsistent with the goals of the Arbitration Act and a scheme of exclusive federal jurisdiction. 15
Permitting severance and arbitration of pendent state claims while

imposing a stay on the federal action impinges upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts to determine federal securities law violations. 16 In effect, the prior arbitration of state claims allows the arbitrator to decide central factual issues which may bind the federal court
through collateral estoppel. 1

The federal court is, however, charged

with sole responsibility to decide the ultimate issues in a federal securi-

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith Inc., 554 F. Supp. 338 (D. Hawaii 1983), and Ging v.
Parker-Hunter Inc., 544 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. Pa. 1982), and Baselski v. Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 535 (N.D. Iil. 1981) (compelling arbitration of arbitrable state claims).
211. See, e.g., Miley, 637 F.2d at 335-37; Sawyer, 642 F.2d at 792-93; Mansbach, 598 F.2d
at 1030; Sibley, 543 F.2d at 543; Surman, 559 F. Supp. at 390; Rankl, [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,827, at 90,120; Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 581-85; Liskey, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,419, at 92,508.
212. Sibley, 543 F.2d at 543 (citations omitted).
213. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 675 F.2d 1169, 1172
(I lth Cir. 1982); Sawyer, 642 F.2d at 792-93; Miley, 637 F.2d at 335-36; Surman, 559 F. Supp.
at 390; Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 581-82; Liskey, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,419, at 92,508.
214. Sawyer, 642 F.2d at 793; Miley, 637 F.2d at 335-36; Sibley, 543 F.2d at 543-44;
Surman, 559 F. Supp. at 390; Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 581-82.
215. See Sawyer, 642 F.2d at 793; Miley, 637 F.2d at 335-36; Mansbach, 598 F.2d at
1030; Sibley, 543 F.2d at 543; Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 581-82; Liskey, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,419, at 92,508-09.
216. See, e.g., Miley, 637 F.2d at 335-36; Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 582-83.
217. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 335-36; Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 582.
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ties claim; prior resolution by the arbitrator forces the federal court to
draw its conclusions based upon the arbitrator's findings." 8
The threat of collateral estoppel may be eliminated by allowing
the federal action to proceed first while staying the arbitration of state
claims. 19 Yet this situation does not solve the problem of exclusive jurisdiction. Bifurcating the federal and state claims creates an incentive
for the plaintiff to forego the federal suit and pursue the faster and
cheaper state arbitration. 2 0 This defeats the very purpose of the federal securities laws and exclusive federal jurisdiction to protect the injured investor. 2 1
On the other hand, if the investor files all of his or her claims in
federal court, he or she would still face a long arbitration proceeding
before receiving full judgment. 22 2 The delay caused by proceeding with
arbitration may induce the investor to drop the state claims and only
collect damages for the federal claims.2 23 This defeats the purpose of
pendent jurisdiction and may result in less than the full compensation
due the investor.2 4
Bifurcation of the proceedings when the arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims are intertwined is clearly duplicative and inefficient. 22 5
Both courts would be required to hear essentially the same evidence
and proof.2 26 Even when the federal case proceeds first, the arbitrator
in the later proceeding hearing the state claims must make essentially
the same factual and legal determinations decided in federal court. 2
Moreover, since the misconduct necessary to prove a section 10(b) violation almost always satisfies the requirements for the state claims of
breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, it is illogical and inefficient to send
the case to arbitration after the federal court has already found the
requisite misconduct. 2 8 In rebuttal to this argument, some courts argue
that duplication in the arbitration of state claims is kept to a minimum

218. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 335-36; Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 582.
219. See, e.g., Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 644; Miley, 637 F.2d at 336.
220. See Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 584 n.7.
221. Id.
222. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 336-37.
223. See id. at 337. But see Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 644 ("plaintiffs who prevail in federal
court may have no need to pursue their arbitrable claims because they will have already recovered
their damages.").
224. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 337.
225. See Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1030; Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 582-85; Rankl,
[1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,827, at 90,120.
226. See Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1030; Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 582; Ranki, [19811
97,827, at 90,120.
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
227. See Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 582.
F.2d at 337.
Miley, 6371983
228.by See
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by collateral estoppel. 22 9
The courts which support the doctrine of intertwining also argue
that the policy of the Arbitration Act is better served by refusing to
sever and arbitrate pendent state claims. 30 The policy of the Arbitration Act was to avoid the unnecessary expense and delay of litigation
by permitting the parties to agree to resolve conflicts through the more
efficient process of arbitration.23 1 Compelling bifurcation and arbitration defeats this policy by extending the length of litigation and, in
effect, doubling the cost of litigation. "
The opposing view held by at least one circuit court and a few
district courts would enforce the severance and arbitration of pendent
state claims.'" When the arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims are
mixed, the district court would have the discretion to stay the arbitration pending resolution of the non-arbitrable federal claims.23 The only
issue for the federal court to determine is whether the arbitration
agreement is valid and binding upon the parties.23 5 In most cases, the
arbitration clause is unambiguous and therefore binding. 3 The basis
for this view is that the strong federal policy favoring arbitration mandates enforcement of these agreements. 8 Securities violations involve
complex issues and factual determinations. Arbitration permits experts
to bring special skills to bear upon the resolution of these technical
2"
cases.
Those courts upholding arbitration offer several counterarguments
to the doctrine of intertwining. Staying arbitration until after the federal trial, it is argued, preserves the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction over non-arbitrable federal claims while avoiding problems of collateral estoppel. 3 9 In any event, threats to exclusive federal jurisdiction

See Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 644-45 (through the use of detailed federal court findings
R. Civ. P. 52(a), duplication of effort is eliminated by collateral estoppel).
230. See. e.g., Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 584-85.
231. See S. REp. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924); Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at
579, 584-85.
232. See Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 584-85 & n.7.
233. See Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981); Roueche v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 338 (D. Hawaii 1983); Ging v. ParkerHunter, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Baselski v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
Inc., 514 F. Supp. 535 (N.D. Ill. 1981). See also Krause, supra note 196, at 716-18.
234. See Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 664; Roueche, 554 F. Supp. at 340; Ging, 544 F. Supp. at
55; Baselski, 514 F. Supp. at 543.
235. See Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 645.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 643, 645-46; Roueche, 554 F. Supp. at 340.
238. See Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 646 (technical disputes such as securities violations are
better resolved by arbitrators with technical expertise).
239. See id. at 644; Roueche, 554 F. Supp. at 340.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/2
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do not justify forsaking arbitration. 40 Furthermore, duplication of
proof should not preclude arbitration.241 With detailed findings by the
district court and the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
52(A),'2 42 collateral estoppel should eliminate the bulk of duplication at
arbitration. 4 Those courts upholding arbitration have found no problem with plaintiffs dropping their arbitrable claims after receiving a
favorable federal verdict.2

One prime problem with the intertwining exception to arbitration
is that this exception "swallows" the rule. 5 Courts adopting the doctrine of intertwining have attempted to restrict its use to cases where

the federal and state claims involve the same factual and legal conclusions.246 However, skillful attorneys should invariably be able to craft
complaints alleging securities law violations "intertwined" with state
claims. 47 This is one valid criticism of the doctrine which the courts
have neither addressed nor corrected.
Courts compelling arbitration have justified their conclusions with
heavy reliance upon the Arbitration Act.248 These courts have read section 3 of the Act as providing for bifurcation of the controversy and
arbitration of the state claims.2 49

The Act was indeed intended to

make arbitration a viable, enforceable alternative to litigation.25 0 By its
terms, however, section 3 does not mention bifurcation or compel split
See Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 644.
See id.
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) states as follows:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58; and in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law
which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. If an opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, it
will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein. Findings of
fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56
or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41(b).
243. See Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 644.
244. See, e.g., id. at 644 n.13. In the alternative, plaintiffs who have succeeded on their
federal claims may settle their arbitrable claims based upon the federal courts' finding of fact. Id.
at 644.
245. See id. at 645-46; Roueche, 554 F. Supp. at 340.
246. See Haydu, 675 F.2d at 1172; Sawyer, 642 F.2d at 792-93; Miley, 637 F.2d at 33536; Surman, 559 F. Supp. at 390; Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 581-82; Liskey, [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) I 98,419, at 92,508.
247. See Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 646; Roueche, 554 F. Supp. at 340.
248. See, e.g., Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 643, 645-46.
249. See id. at 645.
250.by See
9 U.S.C. §1983
2 (1976).
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Congress' intent, as discussed above, was to reverse the

courts' traditional refusal to enforce arbitration agreements. 52 The
Act was aimed at facilitating the resolution of controversies without the
unnecessary expense and delay of protracted litigation.1 5

Congress did

not contemplate that the Act would cause the blind enforcement of arbitration agreements or the circumvention of other federal laws. 5" Arbitration in actions involving mixed or intertwined federal and state
claims disserves the policies of the Arbitration Act and adds delay and
expense to the conflict between the parties.2 Moreover, the arbitrator's traditional capacity to rationally resolve the most tangled of technical factual patterns is often lost; the federal court determinations will
usually estop the arbitrator's consideration of the essential issues.

56

In sum, in the interest of preserving the federal courts' prerogative
over securities law violations as well as ensuring judicial economy and
the plaintiff's interest in compensation, the doctrine of intertwining
should be applied to bar severance when the plaintiff's state and federal
claims are functionally equivalent.
B.

Customer's Profits

A net profit in the customer's account is not a sufficient defense to
a churning cause of action. 5 An accountearning a small net profit
while churned might be shown to have earned a substantial profit without such misconduct. " ' It will of course be more difficult to convince a
jury of a churning violation if the customer received a profit in any
amount.2 5 9 Tactically, the customer ought usually to be able to present
proof of net loss in the value of his or her account and then proceed to
establish the total loss sustained due to excessive commissions paid and
trading losses suffered.

251.
252.
253.

See id. § 3; Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 583.
See, e.g., Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 584.
See S. REp. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924); Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at

584.
254. See Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 583. The court stated that "there is some language
in the legislative history suggesting that Congress had in mind cases in which only arbitrable
claims exist." Id. (emphasis added).
255. See Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 584-85. See also supra text accompanying notes
230-32. But see S. JAFE, supra note 195, at 338-42.
256. See Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 584-85.
257. See Note, supra note 1, at 878-79; Comment, supra note 9, at 296.
258. See, e.g., Miley, 637 F.2d at 326; Rolf, 570 F.2d at 49-50. See also Note, supra note
1, at 878.
259. See Note, supra note 1, at 878.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/2
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Laches, Estoppel, Waiver, and Ratification

The broker may raise the defenses of laches,2 60 estoppel, 2 1
waiver,26 2 and ratification "s to deny liability to the customer in an action brought under section 10(b).'" The Ninth Circuit stated pointedly
that "[tihe purpose of the Securities Exchange Act is to protect the
innocent investor, not one who loses his innocence and then waits to see
how his investment turns out before he decides to invoke the provisions
of the Act."""5 When the investor awaits investment results before
filing suit, the broker may argue waiver and estoppel.2 " Laches may
be similarly invoked as a defense because no applicable federal statute
of limitations exists.2 7
Confirmation slips and periodic statements sent the customer, suf26
ficiently informing him or her of the transactions in the account,
may also act to bar the customer's complaint. If the customer fails to
seasonably relate his or her investment objectives to the broker in such

a case, the broker may invoke waiver, estoppel, or laches. 2" Likewise,
260. Laches requires proof of a lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is
made and prejudice to the party asserting the defense. See Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430
F.2d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1970) (citing Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961)); Mihara,

619 F.2d at 822. See generally S.

JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS §

15.05

(1977 & Supp. 1983).
261. Estoppel may be imposed if the defendant shows that the
plaintiff by his conduct intentionally or through culpable neglect, led defendant to believe
that trading was proceeding as agreed, and that defendant, in reasonable reliance on that
belief, continued to trade so that it would prejudice defendant if plaintiff [were] permitted
to deny that the trading was authorized ....
Karlen, 688 F.2d at 1198 n.4 (district court's instructions to the jury). See generally S. JAFFE,
supra note 260, at § 15.05.
262. Waiver is defined as the voluntary or intentional relinquishment of a known legal right.
See Hecht, 430 F.2d at 1208. To establish the defense that the plaintiff waived his or her rights in
a churning case, the defendant must show that "plaintiff, with knowledge of unauthorized transactions and of the right toobject thereto, voluntarily and intentionally failed to make proper objection within a reasonable time." Karlen, 688 F.2d at 1197 n.4 (district court's instructions to the
jury). See generally S. JAFFE, supra note 260, at § 15.05.
263. Ratification is established by showing the "plaintiff, with full knowledge of the facts,
manifested in some way that he was electing to treat the allegedly unauthorized transactions as
authorized, or that his conduct would be justifiable only if there was such an election." Karlen,
688 F.2d at 1197 n.4 (district court's instructions to the jury).
264. See Karlen, 688 F.2d at 1197-201; Hecht, 430 F.2d at 1207-09.
265. Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1962). See also
Hecht, 430 F.2d at 1207-08.
266. See, e.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 428 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
267. See id.
268. See id. at 428-30. These slips and statements must disclose the essentials of the transactions in order to be effective against the broker. The essentials of the transaction include slips
showing each security or commodity transaction, a monthly statement of the account, and a request for immediate notification of any error. Id. at 426-28.
269.
Id. at 428-30. A
customer may be barred from recovery in a lob-5 action if he or she
Published
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an informed customer who permits his or her broker to rely upon apparent acquiescence with the account for a substantial time may be
barred from any action on account of ratification, estoppel, waiver, and
270
laches.
Furthermore, a broker's proof of customer knowledge of the transactions in the account may enable the broker to prevent a claim of
unsuitability and hence trading losses.27 ' While the informed customer
may be denied a claim of unsuitability, he or she will not thereby be
held responsible for acquiescing in excessive trading of the account.172
Unless the customer is a skilled market analyst, confirmation slips and
periodic statements do not sufficiently apprise the customer of the overall trading status of the account.27 Proof of the customer's lack of
knowledge of, Or failure to consent to, transactions in the account may
of course be presented, and may constitute a defense for the customer. 7 The customer's defense in this regard will of course be a factual issue, based upon the customer's level of sophistication during the
alleged period of misconduct.'"
V.

CONCLUSION

Churning is a unified offense consisting in two harms for the broker's customer: excessive trading of the account as well as trading in
unsuitable securities. For proof of the offense, the customer has traditionally been required to establish excessive trading of the account as
well as exercise of control over the account by the broker. The customer is now also generally held to proof of scienter in the broker-either an intent to defraud or a reckless disregard for the customer's interests.
While a variety of federal avenues of relief have been possible,
failed to exercise due diligence. The broker must show that the customer was guilty of recklessness and not mere negligence. See Petrites v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 646 F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir.
1981); Mihara, 619 F.2d at 822.
270. See Hecht, 238 F. Supp. at 429-30.
271. See, e.g., Mihara, 619 F.2d at 822; Hecht, 430 F.2d at 1211-12.
272. See, e.g., Karlen, 688 F.2d at 1200; Petrites, 646 F.2d at 1035; Mihara, 619 F.2d at
822; Hecht, 430 F.2d at 1211-12.
273. Karlen, 688 F.2d at 1200. Confirmation slips and monthly statements do not enable an

unskilled or inexperienced customer to determine an overall position of net profit or loss. In the
case of an inexperienced customer, courts generally permit an action for churning even though
regular transaction information was received by the customer. Id.
274. See id. at 1200-01; Petrites, 646 F.2d at 1035.
275. See, e.g., Karlen, 688 F.2d at 1200-01. But see Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris
Upham & Co., 709 F.2d 1413, 1417-19 (11 th Cir. 1983) (customer desired to "play the market,"
and knew that the securities purchased would yield results inconsistent with conservative objectives, but he did not question the returns because they were in line with his objectives); Follansbee
v. Davis,.Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 676-78 (9th Cir. 1982) (customer took many positive steps
to insure his account would be actively traded which negated any inference of excessive trading).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/2
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most customers have pursued actions against brokers under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission rule lOb-5. Private rights of action under the
RICO statute have also been attempted, generally without success. On
the state level, customers have founded theories of recovery upon state
law fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, negligence, or
violations of the state's securities laws. The deeper pockets of the
brokerage firm itself have been reached by defrauded customers under
the section 10(b) theory of aiding and abetting. Firms have also been
held vicariously liable to injured customers under either the controlling
persons doctrine of the federal securities laws or common-law principles
of respondeat superior.
Calculating damages which fully compensate the customer for the
offense without being unduly speculative at the broker's expense has
been a difficult task for the courts. To date, the most logical and comprehensive method of calculation has been the Miley-Rolf formula.
Under this calculus, damages are awarded for the excessive commissions paid and trading losses incurred. Under the better view, courts
should additionally have the discretion to permit the parties to assert
different methods of calculation for damages, provided that they are
more accurate. On the punitive side, it is settled that punitive damages
may not be awarded under section 10(b) or rule lOb-5. Such damages
.have, however, been permitted when allowed under the relevant state
law, in cases where state law violations have been joined to federal securities law violations.
The broker has not been left defenseless. Arbitration clauses have
become standard in securities contracts. These clauses, while ineffective
against federal claims, have been invoked by defendant-brokers to remove state claims from the federal forum for arbitration. To retain the
churning claims intact at the federal level and avoid the problems associated with bifurcating the case, several circuits have used the doctrine
of intertwining to justify the retention of arbitrable, pendent state
claims which involve essentially the same problems of proof as the federal claims. A number of federal courts continue to insist on the arbitration of state claims. Other defenses invoked by defendants are those
familiar at common law. Upon proof that the customer knew of the
transactions but acquiesced in or ratified them, brokers have also raised
the defenses of laches, estoppel, waiver, and ratification.
The customer victimized by churning is seemingly left with a great
variety of remedies. Under both state and federal law, churning constitutes fraud in the clearest sense. Moreover, in the last few decades, the
securities field has become one of the most regulated and policed secPublished
by American
eCommons,enterprise,
1983
with a body of rapidly evolving case law of
tors of

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 9:1

great potential benefit to the plaintiff. Federal statutory approaches
have also seemingly kept pace with problems like churning. Under rule
1Ob-5, it is now settled that churning constitutes "a device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud." Under the federal statutes, private rights of actions
by customers have also been implied.
Despite the civil damages currently available to the customer, the
remedies for churning remain sorely inadequate. Proof problems
predominate for the plaintiff. To prove the "unified" offense of churning, the customer must first endure an entire series of improper transactions. If the broker's fraud is discovered after only a short period of
time, the customer's proof of excessive trading will be extremely difficult. The elements of scienter and control are also difficult to demonstrate before a judge or jury. Perhaps most troubling for the plaintiff is
the expense of litigation. The proof essential to a churning cause of
action is almost always voluminous and extensive expert testimony is
almost always necessary.
Even upon proof of the tangled elements of the churning cause of
action, a number of jurisdictions continue to award less than adequate
damages. Effective compensation tends to be denied on the grounds
that the recovery of any amount in excess of the commissions paid is
speculative. Punitive damages are disallowed outright under the federal
securities laws; when permitted, punitive damages are often limited by
the courts to arbitrary cutoff figures.
The broker's ready defenses in a churning suit often limit any
chance of recovery for the customer. Brokers often escape full liability
through the inclusion of arbitration clauses in their standard-form
securites contracts; the attempt is to avoid liberal federal jury awards
in favor of more conservative arbitration awards. Brokerage firms often
escape full liability by establishing the good-faith exception to the controlling persons doctrine after establishing that the controlling persons
provisions supplant the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior.
One recalls the words of an Eighth Circuit justice of some forty
years ago:
The business of trading in securities is one in which opportunities for
dishonesty are of constant recurrence and ever present. It engages acute,
active minds, trained to quick apprehension, decision and action. The
Congress has seen fit to regulate this business. Though such regulation
must be done in strict subordination to constitutional and lawful safeguards of individual rights, it is to be enforced notwithstanding the
frauds to be suppressed may take on more subtle and involved forms
than those in which dishonesty manifests itself in cruder and less specialhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/2
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ized activities?7
The import of the words is perhaps truer now than then. The courts'
obligation is clear. No matter how difficult of detection, no matter what
difficulties of remedy, the courts must come to offer meaningful redress
to the customer in securities fraud cases.
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